It is shown that in the Rovelli relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the notion of absolute or observer independent state is rejected, the conclusion of the ordinary EPR argument turns out to be frame-dependent, provided the conditions of the original argument are suitably adapted to the new interpretation. The consequences of this result for the 'peaceful coexistence' of quantum mechanics and special relativity are briefly discussed.
Introduction
The controversial nature of observation in quantum mechanics has been at the heart of the debates on the foundations of the theory since its early days.
Unlike the situation in classical theories, the problem of how and where we should localize the boundary between systems that observe and systems that are observed is not merely a practical one, nor has there been a widespread consensus on whether there is some fundamental difference between the two classes of systems. The emphasis on the reference to an appropriate observational context, in order for most properties of quantum mechanical systems to be meaningful, has been for example the focus of Bohr's reflections on the foundations of quantum mechanics, and the attention to this level of description has been inherited to a certain extent even by those interpretations of the theory that urged to go well beyond the Copenhagen standpoint.
Although these controversies deal primarily with the long-studied measurement problem, we are naturally led to ask ourselves whether a deeper emphasis on the role of the observer might suggest new directions also about nonlocality. The celebrated argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics turns essentially on the possibility for an observer of predicting the result of a measurement performed in a spacetime region that is supposed to be isolated from the region where the observer is localized. The quantum mechanical description of a typical EPR state, however, prevents from conceiving that result as simply revealing a preexisting property, so that the upshot of the argument is the alternative between completeness and locality: by assuming the former we must give up the latter, and viceversa.
1 It then turns out rather natural to ask whether, 1 Clearly both options are available here since we restrict our attention to the EPR argument. But after the Bell theorem, it is a widespread opinion that the only viable option for ordinary quantum mechanics is in fact the first.
and to what extent, taking into due account the fact that quantum predictions are the predictions of a given observer affects remarkably the structure and the significance of the argument.
The ordinary EPR argument is formulated in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, whose symmetries constitute a Galilei semigroup. Therefore, an obvious form of observer dependence that must be taken into account is the frame dependence that must enter into the description when the whole framework of the EPR argument is embedded into the spacetime of special relativity. It can be shown that a relativistic EPR argument still works and, as a consequence, events pertaining to a quantum system may 'depend' on events pertaining a different quantum system localized in a space-like separated region. 2 However, in the relativistic EPR argument, a special attention must be paid to the limitations placed by this generalization to the attribution of properties to subsystems of a composite system: the lesson of a relativistic treatment of the EPR argument lies in the caution one must take when making assumptions on what an observer knows about the class of quantum mechanical events taking place in the absolute elsewhere of the observer himself. Such observer dependence is essentially linked to the space-like separation between the regions of the measurements and prevents from using a property-attributing language without qualifications; an analysis of these limitations shows that the relativistic EPR argument does not in fact support the widespread claim that nonlocality involves an instantaneous creation of properties at a distance.
3
It must be stressed that this argument implies by itself no definite position about the existence of such influences in the physical world: it involves 2 Clearly there is no consensus on what a reasonable interpretation of this 'dependence' might be, but a thorough discussion of this point is beyond the scope of the present paper.
3 See ( [8] , [9] ); for an analysis of the relevance of this fact to the status of superluminal causation in quantum mechanics, see [11] .
only the logical compatibility between the idea of action-at-a-distance and the special relativistic account of the spacetime structure. More generally, what the argument is meant to point out is the necessity of a shift to the relativistic regime, in order to rigorously assess whether some frequently stated claims about the metaphysical consequences of the EPR argument are really consistent with spacetime physics.
But according to a recent relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, advanced by Carlo Rovelli ([14]), we need not shift to a fully relativistic quantum theory to find a fundamental form of observer dependence. In this interpretation, the very notion of state of a physical system should be considered meaningless unless it is not understood as relative to another physical system, that plays temporarily the role of observer: when dealing with concrete physical systems, it is the specification of such observer that allows the ascription of a state to a system to make sense, so that, to a certain extent, by a relational point of view the selection of such observers features in quantum theory as the specification of a frame of reference does in relativity theory. In the following section the relational interpretation will be sketched, whereas in section 3 a relational analysis of the (relativistic) EPR argument will show that whether the ordinary conclusion of the argument -quantum mechanics is either incomplete or nonlocal -holds or not with respect to a given observer depends on the frame of reference of the latter.
In the final section we will briefly discuss the consequences of this analysis for the so called 'peaceful coexistence thesis' concerning the relation between quantum theory and relativity theory.
2 Relational quantum mechanics and the observer dependence of states
In the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, the relativistic frame dependence of an observer's predictions is not the only source of observer dependence in quantum mechanics: a fundamental form of observer dependence is detected already in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and that concerns the very definability of physical state. In the relational interpretation, the notion of absolute or observer independent state of a system is rejected: it would make no sense to talk about a state of a physical system without referring to an observer, with respect to which that state is defined ( [14] ). Although the analysis of its assumptions and its consequences is developed within non-relativistic quantum mechanics, this claim is somehow reminiscent of the Einsteinian operational critique of the absolute notion of simultaneity for distant observers, and the main idea underlying the interpretation is put forward by analyzing the different accounts that two observers
give of the same sequence of events in a typical quantum measurement process.
Let us consider a system S and a physical quantity Q that can be measured on S. We assume that the possible measurement results are two, q 1 and q 2 (for simplicity the spectrum of Q is assumed to be simple and nondegenerate). The premeasurement state of S at a time t 1 can then be written
we suppose that a measurement of Q is performed and the measurement result is q 2 , according to ordinary quantum mechanics, at a postmeasurement time t 2 the state of S is given by φ q 2 . Let O be the observer performing the measurement; the sequence that O observes is then 
if O ′ performs no measurement, by linearity (2) at t 2 becomes
The measurement process, as described by O ′ , is then given by the sequence Q) will find the eigenvalue belonging to ψ q : therefore S will be in the state ψ q also relative to O ′ (we will return later to the general form that this consistency condition assumes). Therefore, the state of S + O at t 3 relative
to O ′ will be ψ q 2 ⊗ φ q 2 , since at t 2 the state of S relative to O had been reduced to φ q 2 . If we now compare (1) and (4), we see that O and O ′ give a different account of the same sequence of events in the above described measurement: at t 2 O attributes to S the state φ q 2 , whereas O ′ , that views S as a subsystem of S + O, attributes to S the state
The most general assumption of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics can be then summarized as follows: the circumstance that there are different ways in which even a simple quantum mechanical process like the measurement above can be described by different observers suggests then that this relational aspect might be not an accident, but a fundamental property of quantum mechanics. In addition to this, the relational interpretation makes a pair of further assumptions, concerning respectively the universality and the completeness of quantum mechanics.
All physical systems are equivalent.
No specific assumption is made concerning the systems that are supposed to act as observers, except that they must satisfy the laws of quantum mechanics: being observer is not a property fixed once and for all for a privileged class of physical systems, permanently identifiable as 'observation systems' and clearly separable from the rest of physical systems ( [14] , p.1644), nor is it implicitly assumed that such observation systems are conscious entities.
Relational quantum mechanics is a complete physical theory.
The general circumstance that different observers may give different accounts of the same processes is no sign of any fundamental incompleteness of quantum mechanics, but is simply the consequence of a relational meta- The problem with this position, however, is that it implicitly assumes the 'absolute' viewpoint on states of physical systems, namely just the viewpoint that the relational interpretation urges to reject as implausible. Moreover, on the basis of the above account, one might draw a general distinction between a description and an observation of a system S by an observer O: in the former case, a 'description' of S involves no interaction between O and S at the time in which O describes S, although it is still necessarily based on some prior interaction between S and other systems. On the other hand, we may say that O 'observes' S when O actually measures some relevant physical quantity on S: it is clear that, in this case, there is an interaction between S and O that occurs exactly when O is said to 'observe' S.
If we return to our specific example, we might consider the 'description'
that O ′ gives of S at a given t in terms of correlation properties of the system O + S as the maximal amount of information on the measurement process involving S and O that is available to O ′ in absence of interaction at t between O ′ and the composite system O+S. So let us recall the sequence (4) of events. The states ψ q 1 ⊗ φ q 1 , ψ q 2 ⊗ φ q 2 turn out to be eigenstates belonging to the eigenvalue 1 -the record was correct -whereas the states ψ q 1 ⊗ φ q 2 , ψ q 2 ⊗ φ q 1 turn out to be eigenstates belonging to the eigenvalue 0 -the record was incorrect, namely
On the basis of the above account, the consistency requirement that we men- 
A relational analysis of the EPR argument
An ideal place to look at to see how a relational approach might change the 'absolute' view of quantum mechanical states is just the framework in which the EPR argument is usually developed ( [7] , [2] ).
The physical framework common to all variants of this argument involves a two-particles' system, whose subsystems interact for a short time and then separate. The original formulation of the EPR argument takes into account a pair of quantities for each particle, such in a way that the members of each pair are mutually incompatible. We will take into account the usual nonrelativistic Bohm version of the original argument, formulated as a spin correlation experiment, and in a simplified form that deals with just one quantity for each particle ( [13] ). The assumptions of the argument will be slightly rephrased as compared to the widespread formulation, but this rephrasing does not substantially affect the argument.
Reality
If, without interacting with a physical system S, we can predict with certainty -or with probability one -the result q of the measurement of a quantity Q performed at time t on S, then at a time t ′ immediately after t, there exists a property -associated with q and denoted by [q] -that is actually satisfied by S: any such property is said to be an objective property of S.
Completeness
Any physical theory T describing a physical system S accounts for every objective property of S.
Locality
No objective property of a physical system S in a state s can be influenced by measurements performed at a distance on a different physical system.
Adequacy
The statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are correct.
A word of comment on the formulation of the Reality condition is in order.
As is expected, the notion of an objective property The experimental situation considered (often called an EPR-Bohm correlation experiment) involves a two spin-1/2 particles' system S 1 + S 2 prepared at the source in the singlet state. If we focus only on the spin part, such state of S 1 + S 2 can be written for any spatial direction x as
where:
• φ i,x (±) is the eigenvector of the operator σ i,x , representing spin up or down along the direction x for the particle i = 1, 2;
• φ 1,x (+) ⊗ φ 2,x (−) and φ 1,x (−) ⊗ φ 2,x (+) belong to the tensor product H 1 ⊗ H 2 of the Hilbert spaces H 1 and H 2 associated respectively to subsystems S 1 and S 2 .
S 1 and S 2 are supposed to fly off in opposite directions; spin measurements are supposed to be performed when S 1 and S 2 occupy two widely separated spacetime regions R 1 and R 2 , respectively. It follows from (5) and Adequacy that if on measurement we find spin up along the direction x for the particle S 1 , the probability of finding spin down along the same direction x for the particle S 2 equals 1: it is usual to say that S 1 and S 2 are strictly anticorrelated.
Let us suppose now that, for a given direction z, we measure σ 1,z at time t 1 and we find −1. Adequacy then allows us -via anticorrelation -to predict with probability one the result of the measurement of σ 2,z for any time t 2 immediately after t 1 , namely +1. Then, according to Reality, there exists an objective property [+1] of S 2 at t 2 . By Locality, [+1] was an objective property of S 2 also at a time t 0 < t 1 , since otherwise it would have been 'created' instantaneously by the act of performing a spin measurement on S 1 .
However, at time t 0 the state of S 2 is a mixture, namely
since the entangled state (5), although it is a pure state of S 1 + S 2 , uniquely determines the states of the subsystems as mixed states. Thus S 2 is shown to satisfy an objective property in a state which is not an eigenstate of σ 2,z . However all quantum mechanics is able to predict is the satisfaction of properties such as [+1] only in eigenstates of σ 2,z : quantum mechanics then turns out to be incomplete, since there exist objective properties that are provably satisfied by a system described by quantum mechanics but that cannot be described in quantum mechanical terms. By a strictly logical point of view, the conclusion of the argument can be rephrased as the statement that the conjunction of Reality, Completeness, Locality and Adequacy leads to a contradiction.
In the framework of ordinary quantum mechanics, Reality and Adequacy cannot be called into question: whereas the latter simply assumes that the probabilistic statements of quantum mechanics are reliable, without the former no quantum system could ever satisfy objective properties, not even such a property as having a certain value for a given quantity one is going to measure, when the system is prepared in an eigenstate belonging to that (eigen)value of that quantity. 4 The alternative then reduces to the choice between Completeness and Locality: by assuming Completeness, we then turn the above EPR argument into a nonlocality argument. A relativistic formulation of this argument can also be given: although the different geometry of spacetime must be taken into account, the only generalization lies in adapting the Locality condition, to the effect that objective properties of a physical system cannot be influenced by measurements performed in space-like separated regions on a different physical system ( [8] ).
Let us turn now to a relational analysis of the argument. In a relational approach to the EPR argument, we have to modify accordingly its main conditions (Adequacy is obvious), basically by relativizing the objectivity of properties to given observers. The new versions might read as follows:
If an observer O, without interacting with a physical system S, can predict with certainty (or at any rate with probability one) at time t the value q of a physical quantity Q measurable on S in a state s, then, at a time t ′ immediately after t, q corresponds to a property of S that is objective relative to O.
Any physical theory T describing a physical system S accounts for every property of S that is objective relative to some observer.
No property of a physical system S that is objective relative to some observer can be influenced by measurements performed in space-like separated regions on a different physical system.
Once the above weaker sense of objectivity is defined, Completeness * is little more than rephrased, whereas R-Locality * guarantees that no property that is non-objective (in the weaker sense of objective as relative to a given observer)
can be turned into an objective one (still in the weaker sense) simply by means of operations performed in space-like separated regions (at this stage, already the relativistic version of the Locality condition in the ordinary EPR argument is assumed). . But when, after leaving the source, S 1 and S 2 are subject to measurement, the spacetime regions in which the measurements are supposed to take place are mutually isolated. Then we suppose that, for a given direction z, an observer O 1 measures σ 1,z on S 1 at time t 1 > t 0 and finds −1. Now the strict spin value anticorrelation built into the state (5) allows O 1 to predict with certainty the spin value for O 2 without interacting with it. Namely Adequacy allows O 1 to predict with probability one the value of σ 2,z on S 2 for any time t 2 immediately after t 1 , namely +1. (P φ 1,x (+) + P φ 1,x (−) ) and 1 2 (P φ 2,x (+) + P φ 2,x (−) ) respectively, and there is no matter of fact as to which observer 'is right'. Until O 2 does not perform a measurement, O 2 may then describe the measurement by O 1 simply as the establishment of a correlation between O 1 and S 1 .
The conclusion to be drawn is then that the question: when is an observer allowed to claim, via the EPR argument, that quantum mechanics is either incomplete or nonlocal? has a frame-dependent answer. Let us denote with M t O (σ, S, ρ, R) the event that an observer O performs at time t a measurement of a physical quantity σ on a system S in the state ρ in the region R. If we set
the three possible cases are: 
Final discussion
As we recalled above, the EPR incompleteness argument for ordinary quantum mechanics can be turned into a nonlocality argument, that appears to threaten the mutual compatibility at a fundamental level of quantum theory and relativity theory. The received view has been that, relevant that nonlocality may be by a foundational viewpoint, the conflict engendered by it is not as deep as it seems. There would be in fact a 'peaceful coexistence' between the two theories, since locality in quantum mechanics would be recovered at the statistical level and in any case -it is argued -nonlocal correlations are uncontrollable so no superluminal transmission of information is allowed.
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Such view, however, has several drawbacks, first of all the fact that it is based on highly controversial notions such as the 'controllability' (or 'uncontrollability') of information, or on the vagueness of establishing when it is exactly that an 'influence' becomes a bit of information, or on whether relativity theory prohibits superluminal exchanges of information but not superluminal travels of influences, and subtleties like that. On the other hand, the very inapplicability of the ordinary EPR argument in relational quantum mechanics prevents this kind of controversies and provides a new way to interpret the peaceful coexistence thesis, since in the relational interpretation no compelling alternative between completeness and locality via the EPR argument can be derived in a frame-independent way.
The observer dependence that affects the EPR argument in a relational approach to quantum mechanics might also imply a different view of the hidden variables program. Most hidden variable theories do essentially two things. First, on the basis of the EPR argument's conclusion they assume the incompleteness of quantum mechanics as a starting point; second, they introduce the hypothesis of a set of 'complete' states of a classical sort, the averaging on which gives predictions that are supposed to agree with the quantum mechanical ones (see for instance [4] , [13] ). If however, in a relational approach to quantum mechanics, the conditions of Reality * , Completeness * , R-Locality * and Adequacy need not clash from one frame of reference to the other, the attempt of 'completing' quantum mechanics by introducing hidden variables turns out to be unmotivated by a relational point of view, and so does any nonlocality argument that has this attempt as a premise. Moreover, the hypothetical complete states of hidden variables theories are conceived themselves as observer-independent, so that an absolute view of the states of physical system would be reintroduced, albeit at the level of the hidden variables.
The issue of whether statistical correlations across space-like separated regions are a real threat to a peaceful coexistence between quantum theory and relativity theory is being more and more investigated also in the framework of algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT): in fact a suitable form of Bell inequality -an inequality that in different formulations has been extensively studied with reference to the nonlocality issue in non-relativistic quantum mechanics ( [1] ) -has been shown also to be violated in AQFT (see for instance [18] and [17] ). The questions of whether a relational interpretation of hidden variables, and imposed over and above a theory that is intrinsically nonlocal such as ordinary quantum mechanics.
